Cash transfers and political support: evidence from Ecuador

Abstract

PurposeThis paper evaluates the argument that conditional cash transfer program recipients vote for the incumbent. We also test the hypothesis stating that ceasing to receive the benefit hinders support for the incumbent.Design/methodology/approachUsing a regression discontinuity design, we assess the impact of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano cash transfer program on pro-incumbent voting of each of these four groups.FindingsWe did not find a significant impact of the transfer on pro-incumbent vote intention in any of the pairwise comparisons, which suggests that contextual factors determining retrospective voting may play an important role in shaping the relationship between pro-incumbent voting and social policy transfers.Originality/valueDrawing on quasi-experimental evidence from Ecuador, where the eligibility criteria of the program changed exogenously, we evaluate the impacts of several treatments on pro-incumbent voting. We are able to identify four distinct groups: recipients under both eligibility criteria, nonrecipients under both criteria, new recipients and new nonrecipients.