Caseloads, Performance, and Street-Level Bureaucracy

Abstract

It is well known that staff in public agencies have substantial discretion in carrying out their tasks. And it is widely claimed that heavy caseload pressure exacerbates such discretion. This study tests models of discretionary behavior induced by heavy caseloads in public agencies. It finds strong support for the argument that, facing both high short- term and long-term case volume, staff will segment caseloads by using readily identifiable "cues" to select cases for predominant attention, consistent with dominant staff values. This segmentation, or tracking, is found in turn systematically to distort allocation of outcomes, because of correlations between cues and characteristics of clients. The analysis is based on both intra- and inter-agency variation in caseload pressure, using quantitative data derived from the study of consumer protection and white collar crime prosecution bureaus in local prosecutors' offices nationwide.