Carter and the Failure of Foreign Policy Reform

Abstract

The 1970s were a period of aborted change in U.S. foreign policy. The pervasive post-World War II consensus among foreign policy elites crumbled under the weight of the Vietnam war and global economic travails. New policy paradigms such as detente and liberal internationalism not only stirred debate but often served as the basis for marked policy departures. Richard Nixon was the first American president to challenge past orthodoxy when he took bold steps toward improving relations with both the Soviet Union and mainland China. Yet the influence of new schools of thought was most evident during the early years of the Carter presidency. Jimmy Carter and his advisers believed that many of the traditional rationales that had guided U.S. foreign policy for over a generation were now outmoded and inappropriate to altered world realities. By the end of the decade, however, these new orientations had largely been abandoned in favor of policies reminiscent of the cold war era. Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 only confirmed the passing of this liberal interlude in U.S. foreign policy. This article offers a frankly revisionist (though admittedly partial) explanation for the failure of policy reform during the Carter years. Contrary to many observers, I argue that Carter's initial foreign policy design was neither confused and incoherent nor simply a reflection