Abstract
This chapter focuses on information exchange and cartels. Information exchange among competitors can be procompetitive, but it can also soften competition or facilitate price fixing. It argues that properly structured information exchange is unlikely to cause antitrust problems; therefore careful attention to agency guidelines and case law - which provide fairly clear guidance on this issue - is advisable. It also demonstrates that judicial and agency attitudes toward information exchange are contingent on underlying attitudes about whether market economies should be characterized more by robust atomistic competition or rather by collaboration among rival firms.
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