Abstract
This article discusses the reasons for cartel stability by using the Swedish Steel Casting Cartel as an example. Previous research points out organisational structure and the ability to deal with exit entry and cheating as crucial for stability. In this article, the development of social norms, morally legitimised within the cartel, is discussed as a possible explanation for cartel stability. The organisational structure developed was flexible enough to deal with problems of exit entry and cheating. The discussions on quotas and prices led to a common view on fair prices. The conclusion is that the organisational structure can partly explain why the Steel Casting Group was relatively stable but that there are indications that the development of common social norms related to the value of fairness was also an important explanatory factor.
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