Cartelization of the California-Arizona Orange Industry, 1934-1981

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Previous articleNext article No AccessCartelization of the California-Arizona Orange Industry, 1934-1981Lawrence ShepardLawrence Shepard Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 29, Number 1Apr., 1986 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business and The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467110 Views: 5Total views on this site Citations: 24Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1986 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:John M. Crespi, James M. 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Rose Chapter 25 The effects of economic regulation, (Jan 1989): 1449–1506.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1573-448X(89)02013-3Hoy F. Carman, Daniel H. Pick Marketing California—Arizona lemons without marketing order shipment controls, Agribusiness 4, no.33 (May 1988): 245–259.https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6297(198805)4:3<245::AID-AGR2720040304>3.0.CO;2-YKathleen A. Miller, Michael H. Glantz Climate and economic competitiveness: Florida freezes and the global citrus processing industry, Climatic Change 12, no.22 (Apr 1988): 135–164.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138936