Abstract
In some product markets suppliers interact with one another only as sellers of one product. In other product markets suppliers are linked beyond one particular product market. Collusion is likely to be more profitable, more stable, and more frequent when a set of collusion-minded firms are linked in various ways.1 Links can be forged by multi-product, multi-national firms in competition across product markets and geographic markets. Links can be forged by the acquisition, assertion, and licensing of patents.2 Links can be forged by professional firms that advise cartel members.3 And links can be forged with contracts that connect prices in one small aspect of a market to prices that impact much larger aspects of that market or even related markets.4 Even though these links can be in plain sight of cartel enforcers, they get insufficient attention. In this article, we explore market linkage and multi-market cartels and suggest reforms to enforcement practices that account for linkage.
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