Carrier Sanctions and ILOs: Anticipated Enforcement of Visa Requirements through ‘Imperfect Delegation’—Diverting Flows, Entrenching Unsafety

Abstract

Member States started adopting carrier liability regulations from the mid-1980s, seemingly as a direct response to increasing numbers of asylum requests, with immigration liaison officer (ILO) schemes proliferating afterwards. Techniques of ‘remote control’ have now been communautarised, providing an additional layer of control. Both carriers and ILOs have privileged access to migrants bound to the EU already at the pre-entry phase. Making them responsible for the anticipated enforcement of visas has the potential to block lines of regular (and safe) access to those in need of international protection. This chapter is concerned with these developments. It analyses carrier sanctions and ILOs legislation, comparing the EU regime with its international counterparts. The review encompasses the pre- and post-Schengen periods as well as recent innovations concerning the automated treatment and transfer of advance passenger information (API) and the creation of ‘Frontex liaison officers’. The impact of carrier sanctions and ILO activities on refugee flows is scrutinized at the end, pointing at a structural incompatibility of advance border enforcement, through a model of ‘imperfect delegation’/’hidden coercion’, with basic guarantees against denial of entry.