Abstract
This essay considers Carnap and Quine’s views on ontology. While both Carnap and Quine see their disagreement over the status of ontology as a legitimate philosophical undertaking as ultimately rooted in their disagreement over the analytic/synthetic distinction, it argues that this cannot be so since Quine comes to accept a notion of analyticity without changing his views on ontology. Instead, it is argued that the more fundamental point underlying the disagreement about the status of ontology is Carnaps advocacy of the Principle of Tolerance, which Quine never comes to accept.
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