Care-theoretic semantics

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues for two claims, one conservative and the other one less so. First is the thesis that the range of linguistic features that can be considered authentically semantic is far wider in breadth than is typically acknowledged. In particular, linguistic phenomena that are entirely orthogonal to veridical considerations—including ethical matters—are sufficiently robust to support e.g. theories of meaning and inference. Second, we aim to argue that philosophy’s prioritization of truth obscures the existence of an important prior concern for care or the reduction of harm. Specifically, we offer a topic-theoretic interpretation of the bounds consequence reading of sequents put forward by Restall and Ripley. We argue that this reading allows us to provide a rigorous semantics using the newly introduced categories of care and harm. An important objection may be that philosophy requires the centrality and priority of truth above all else insofar as truth-like features are necessary to ground theories of meaning or reasoning. Anticipating such an objection, we will argue that care not only is an authentically semantic feature but also that care is sufficient to ground such theories.