Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO

Abstract

In 1877, Lord Salisbury, commenting on Great Britain's policy on Eastern Question, noted that the commonest error in politics is sticking to carcass of dead policies. (1) Salisbury was bemoaning fact that many influential members of British ruling class could not recognize that history had moved on; they continued to cling to policies and institutions that were relics of another era. Salisbury went on to note that cost was enormous because this preoccupation with anachronism damaged Britain's real interests. Despite Salisbury's clever words, his observation is nothing new. Throughout Western history policymakers often have tended to rely on past realities, policies, and institutions to assess and deal with contemporary and future situations. Post-Cold War American policymakers have not been immune from falling into this trap. Indeed, this inertial approach, characterized by Washington's unbending support for NATO and its expansion, has defined American foreign and security policy since collapse of Soviet Union and bipolar world. During Cold War, NATO provided proper linchpin of American--and West European--security policy, and served as a useful, even fundamental deterrent to Soviet military might and expansionism. However, NATO's time has come and gone, and today there is no legitimate reason for it to exist. Although strong differences exhibited in Alliance over war against Iraq have accelerated NATO's irrelevancy, root causes of its problems go much deeper. Consequently, for both United States and Europe, NATO is at best an irrelevant distraction and at worst toxic to their respective contemporary security needs. The Inertial Imperative The end of Cold War presented a problem similar to one faced by post-World War II American leaders. A tectonic shift had occurred that required innovation, creativity, and a real understanding of evolving world. For some experts--both in government and academia, as well as on both sides of Atlantic--the collapse of Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact called into question need for NATO. They recognized that an era had ended and time was ripe for a basic debate about future of NATO and Western security policies and structures. Unfortunately, policymakers in Washington who established priorities for post-Cold War era reacted quite differently from their predecessors. A small, influential coterie of policymakers in elder Bush and then Clinton administrations reacted reflexively and inertially, cutting off what should have been useful debate on future. Moreover, virtually all of officials who helped define foreign and security policy in Bush 41 Administration have resurfaced in current Bush Administration. According to them, existence and viability of NATO was not to be questioned. It was to remain basically same successful alliance of American and European foreign and security policy that it had been since 1949. But a fundamental change was taking place in post-Cold War security environment. In 1949, a genuine, measurable security threat justified NATO for all its members. Now, with end of Cold War, inertial attachment to NATO meant that alliance had to seek or invent reasons to justify its existence and relevance. American officials recognized threats to alliance. NATO needed props. Expansion into former Warsaw Pact was one. Not only did expansion provide a whole new raison d'etre for alliance, but--perhaps more important--it spawned a large new bureaucracy and accompanying busyness that provide lifeblood of institutions trying to justify their existence. At same time, theological mantra changed. Since there was no longer an enemy, NATO could not be described as a defensive alliance, it now was to be a combination of a wide-ranging political and collective security alliance. …