Abstract
In the context of a carbon trading mechanism, this study examines the distribution of emission reduction responsibilities between ports and shipping companies. By constructing Stackelberg game models in four scenarios, equilibrium strategies are found from both economic and environmental dimensions, and the impacts of carbon pricing and port green subsidies on the economy and environment are analyzed. The research indicates that, considering both economic and environmental benefits, it is optimal for members of the port and shipping supply chain to undertake emission reduction investments. Furthermore, under the carbon trading mechanism, the profits of ports and shipping companies vary with carbon prices, with the highest profits for ports in the YY scenario. The YN and YY scenarios enhance emission reduction efficiency, while the environmental damage in the NY scenario may be close to that in the NN scenario. Green subsidies improve the profits and environmental performance of port and shipping enterprises, highlighting the critical role of green subsidies in environmental benefits.
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