Abstract
In an article published in this journal, Rapoport and Amaldoss [Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W., 2000. Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: an experimental investigation of states of knowledge. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 483–521] analyze symmetric and asymmetric investment games similar to two-player all-pay auctions with bid caps. In this note, we correct an error in their characterization of the set of Nash equilibria of their symmetric investment game. We discuss the implications for the analysis of data from Rapoport and Amaldoss's experiments.
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