Capitalist Response to State Intervention: Theories of the State and Political Finance in the New Deal

Abstract

Three theories of the -corporate liberal, hegemonic competition, and state autonomy offer different explanations for capitalist involvement in the New Deal coalition. I evaluate these three theoretical explanations by examining the contributions to the U.S. presidential campaign of 1936 made by three segments of the capitalist class: members of wealthy capitalist families, elites, and members of the of interlocking directors. Find that although one out of three capitalists contributed to the presidential campaign, only one out of 12 contributed to the Democratic party. Members of the inner circle and elites were more likely to contribute to the Republican party than were members of capitalist families. Members of southern and Jewish capitalist families were among the major contributors to the Democratic party. Finally, elites from regulated industries were less likely than were those from other industries to contribute to the Republican party. These results provide some confirmation of state autonomy theory and partial confirmation of certain elements of corporate liberal theory. However, they suggest modification of the hegemonic competition theory.