Abstract
The paper studies a manager's optimal earnings forecasting strategy and optimal earnings management policy in a setting where both the mean and the variance of the distribution generating the firm's cash flows are unknown. The paper shows that the equilibrium price of the firm is a function of the manager's forecast, the firm's reported earnings, and the squared error in the manager's earnings forecast. The model in the paper contains several predictions, including: (i) the manager manipulates earnings to reduce his forecast error at the earnings announcement date; (ii) the firm's stock price is more sensitive to the firm's actual earnings announcement than to the manager's forecast; and (iii) controlling for the level of reported earnings and the magnitude of the earnings surprise, the firm's price is higher when it has a positive surprise at the earnings announcement date than when it has a negative surprise.
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