Abstract
This paper investigates the empirical puzzle of asymmetric capital market access in China. The existing literature has focused on corporate monopolies, technological advances and the power of lead firms. However, the role of the political decision-making process behind market access has been neglected. This study fills an analytical void, by highlighting the role of corporate power resources in shaping the receptiveness of the Chinese government toward foreign investors. Based on a large new dataset coupling interviews with database analysis, this paper demonstrates that these power resources are decisive for explaining asymmetric market access across foreign investors. They highlight that market access is a negotiated economic outcome that bridges bargaining processes between interdependent state and market agents. The results have important implications for the study of globalisation and institutional change. They challenge dominant claims that policymaking systems are resistant to change and that the global spread of liberal market forces has led to the retreat of the state.
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