Capacity sharing in a network of enterprises using the Gale–Shapley model

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze a model of capacity sharing for a set of independent firms, geographically distributed, that often have to implement an opportune tool to integrate their resources and demand forecasts in order to gather a specific production objective. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game and identify a capacity sharing solution using the Gale–Shapley model. The allocation rule takes into account the utility functions of the involved firms, and we show how the capacity allocation rule can be designed to induce all firms to report truthfully their information. Moreover, we show that, under this allocation rule, truth telling is a dominant strategy, with each firm reporting truthfully its private information, regardless of the reporting decisions of other firms. Moreover, the proposed research develops a distributed approach able to facilitate the capacity sharing process by using a multi-agent architecture; then a discrete simulation environment has been developed to compare the proposed approach with a centralized one. Several simulation scenarios were conducted to analyze the performances' trends in various environment conditions.