Abstract

In this paper we examine aspects of Canguilhem’s philosophy of biology, concerning the knowledge of life and its consequences on science and vitalism. His concept of life stems from the idea of a living individual, endowed with creative subjectivity and norms, a Kantian view which “disconcerts logic”. In contrast, two different approaches ground naturalistic perspectives to explore the logic of life (Jacob) and the logic of the living individual (Maturana and Varela) in the 1970s. Although Canguilhem is closer to the second, there are divergences; for example, unlike them, he does not dismiss vitalism, often referring to it in his work and even at times describing himself as a vitalist. The reason may lie in their different views of science.

Highlights

  • In Canguilhem’s philosophy, life disconcerts logic by its intrinsically self-produced or “autopoietic” nature in contrast with mechanical devices

  • Canguilhem as a historian and philosopher of science has a high regard for biology,3 he thinks that there is something missing in scientific knowledge trying to understand life via analysis, this is the only way knowledge can probably proceed

  • Canguilhem was aware and acceptant of the biology of his times,9 and paid attention both to the physiological perspective and to the evolutionary/molecular biology perspective. He does not appear to be keen to develop what we could call a logic of life or the living, why? Taking into account Canguilhem’s views, we examine some aspects of the nature of life and organisms as discussed in the biology of the 1970s, such as F

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Summary

Introduction

In Canguilhem’s philosophy, life disconcerts logic by its intrinsically self-produced or “autopoietic” nature in contrast with mechanical devices.

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