Abstract
I offer a candidate-centered explanation for split-ticket voting patterns in the 2000 lower house elections in Japan. Drawing upon individual-level and aggregate data, I accurately estimate ticket splitting in Japan for the first time. I argue that ticket splitting in the mixed electoral system is frequently the result of unequal competition among the parties’ district candidates. Parties such as the LDP with more candidates fare much better in the SMD balloting than in the PR vote. This, and the disproportionality of the SMD vote–seat translation, contributes to the LDP's electoral victory. The analyses also demonstrate the difficulty of estimating ticket splitting in multiparty settings and validate the assumption that PR votes reflect sincere party preferences.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
