Cancellation Crises

Abstract

Nixon considered canceling the Moscow summit even as Kissinger finalized plans to go on a secret trip to the Soviet Union in April 1972 to discuss Vietnam and the summit planning. Nixon was concerned with the deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam, and he worried that the Soviets would cancel the summit in solidarity with their ally Hanoi after the United States responded with force against North Vietnam. However, the Nixon White House laid the groundwork to encourage the Soviets to consider détente separately from Vietnam, conveying a tacit modus vivendi via the confidential channel with Dobrynin. While Nixon pondered the possibility of canceling the summit, the administration also used back channels to read Soviet intentions. Ultimately, Treasury Secretary John Connally convinced Nixon to leave the onus of any cancellation or postponement of the summit to the Soviets. Domestic opinion polls buttressed the president’s decision since the American public did not see the Moscow summit as interrelated to the situation in Vietnam. In the Kremlin, Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Kosygin blocked hard-liners’ attempts and consolidated control in favor of the summit while rhetorically condemning the American bombing-mining campaign against North Vietnam. The summit thus became the successful product of U.S.-Soviet back-channel diplomacy.