Canadian Provincial Budget Outcomes: A Long–run and Short–run Perspective

Abstract

This paper tests a theory of public budgeting as a long–run and short–run process. In this model, political decision makers strive to achieve budgetary balance over the long–run but are constrained in the short–run and follow incremental decision–making. First, the budget equilibrium theory is elaborated upon and is used to explain the relationship between revenues, expenditures, and debt along with control variables one being provincial general elections. Second, the interaction between these variables is tested with a vector error correction model for each of the Canadian provinces using annual data between 1961 and 2000. The results show that in the long–run the driving force of provincial budgeting was expenditure control initiatives in seven of the ten provinces. In the short–run, incrementalism occurred in all of the provinces and a political business cycle was evident in six provinces.