Canada's Entry into the OAS

Abstract

Since mid-1990s, identity has re-emerged as a key concept within international relations theory. The social constructivist view of international relations considers cultural variables, and particularly identity, as prime agents in states' decision-making. For constructivists, identity is the core building block of interest, national or otherwise, and therefore they see national identity and national interests that derive from it as central in state action1. In case of Canada, concept of identity was, in past, central to analysis of history. Until 1960s, English-speaking Canadian historians incessantly pondered nature of country's national identity, and offered paradigms of historical interpretations that proposed powerful representations of Canadian identity. In more recent years, as practice of history shifted from a national focus to topics in social history, reflection on Canadian identity has been taken over by political scientists, and none more than specialists of foreign policy, as Robert Bothwell recently pointed out: An uncertain national identity has been, and remains, a major theme in Canadian history, and has been reflected in Canada's foreign relations.2 In case of Canada, choices in foreign policy have not only reflected current self-perceptions of country; they have sometimes contributed to nation-building. Projecting a good image abroad is, for Canadians, a major preoccupation,3 since Canada's international reputation can, to a certain degree, bolster its national identity.This article is part of a wider project to examine evolution of Canada's foreign policy in relation to redefinition of its national identity from end of Second World War onwards. The issue of membership in Organization of American States is particularly interesting because it seems to constitute a striking reorientation of Canada's foreign policy. It is linked to that other major change in Canada's international relations, acceptance of free trade with United States. The Free Trade Agreement of 1988, entry in OAS in 1990, and North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, seem to symbolize acceptance by Canada of a continental destiny that it had long refused.This refusal had been expressed not only by several rejections of free trade with United States, but also by refusal to join hemispheric institutions. The Pan-American Union was created in 1910, but Canada always refused to join, even after Second World War, when United States had become reconciled to Canada's membership and was even lobbying for it. Instead, Canada waited until 1990 to join OAS, which raises questions of why it waited so long, and why it changed its mind at this particular point in history. This question has been examined in a great many books and articles by Canadian scholars. Gordon Mace, in particular, has demonstrated convincingly that external factors - namely, move towards regional economic blocks in 1980s - are crucial to explain Canada's decision. Nonetheless, I would argue that internal factors, particularly Canada's evolving self-image and new view of its place in Americas that resulted from it, were also prime reasons behind Canada's entry in OAS.Change in self-perception is a key factor; but I will also show that this reorientation, striking as it was, took place within an unchanged framework, since one of Canada's key preoccupations while getting involved in Americas was to pursue its long tradition of balancing US influence. In post- Second World War period, this had been achieved by favouring Canada's participation in multilateral organizations, where it could find allies to counterbalance overwhelming US power. Getting involved in Americas was, as it were, a new tactic in Canada's long-term strategy of keeping Americanization at bay through multilateralism. Starting in 1990s, both a reconstructed national identity, and new international elements, which I will examine, made it possible for Canada to carry out its traditional multilateral strategy in new arena of Americas. …