Canada's Addiction to American Security: The Illusion of Choice in the War on Terrorism

Abstract

1. America's Addiction to Security and Public Safety Despite the absence of another terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, American officials are becoming increasingly addicted to achieving perfect security and absolute safety in the midst of an unwinnable war on terrorism. Success will remain elusive because, over time, more groups and individuals with expanding lists of grievances will acquire the power to inflict levels of damage considered by political leaders to be unacceptable. In essence war is becoming privatized (Nye 2004) (3) through the democratization of technology and knowledge (Friedman, 2001), (4) miniaturization of weaponry and lethality, increasing accessibility and transferability of weapons of mass destruction, and a rising number of competing terrorist groups with religious, political and financial motivations to terrorize. Even more disturbing are trends towards the privatization of political power. The Madrid train bombings in March 2004 revealed that a relatively straightforward attack by a small group of terrorists could have a significant impact on the outcome of a democratic election and play a major role in the immediate withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. The Philippine government withdrew their troops in July 2004 in response to the kidnapping of a single truck driver in Baghdad. These successes reveal that terrorists have acquired a measure of political power that far exceeds the influence of hundreds of thousands of anti-war protesters in Spain and the Philippines who were demanding the same outcome (an early withdrawal from Iraq), but failed. Mass protests in Katmandu after the murder of twelve Nepalese workers in Baghdad provoked both an apology from the government in Nepal for failing to secure their release, and an explanation from officials that they received no offer from the kidnappers--the implication being that had such an offer been made the government would almost certainly have negotiated with the terrorists. The Kuwaiti government paid a $500,000 ransom for the release of seven Indian and Kenyan employees of a Kuwaiti company involved in post-war reconstruction in Iraq. (5) Several Egyptian, Jordanian, and Turkish companies agreed to cut short their constructions operations in Iraq in exchange for the release of kidnapped employees. (6) In August 2004, terrorists threatened to kill two French journalists as a protest against legislation in France banning the wearing of Muslim headscarves in public schools. The kidnappings provoked a flurry of French diplomatic activity resulting in the release of the hostages in December, 2004. (7) Apparently even the strongest critics of the U.S.-UK led war in Iraq are not immune from kidnapping and extortion. More recently, the Italian government was forced to address accusations that $1 million was paid for the release of two aid workers in October 2004, and significantly more to obtain the release of Italian reporter, Giuliana Sgrena, after a controversial rescue operation in March 2005. (8) Negotiating with terrorists is standard operating procedure for governments eager to avoid a public backlash against policies that are too closely associated with an unpopular war, and an even less popular American president. But these concessions (and others to follow) will guarantee that more kidnappings, bombings and killings will occur as coalitions of insurgents and terrorists cooperate to build on political victories and financial windfalls. (9) Consider the following illustration of the privatization of political power in Iraq today--the overwhelming consensus across the international community is that success in Iraq requires an end to the insurgency and a credible and sustained effort by a broad-based, coalition of states supporting an unwavering commitment to post-conflict reconstruction, counter-insurgency, liberalization, and democratization. Yet despite this multilateral consensus, supported by unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, unilateral self-interests motivated by domestic political imperatives to protect their own citizens and troops remain the most powerful determinants of whether states join (or remain in) the U. …