Canada, the Great Powers, and the Middle Eastern Arms Race, 1950–1956

Abstract

1950s saw many transitions in the international and regional politics of the Middle East : among them the surrender of AngloFrench hegemony to the superpowers, the entrenchment of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the rise of Arab nationalism. These transitions were accelerated by the flow of advanced technology into the region communications equipment, for example, but above all weapons. The sale of weapons, first by the western powers and later by the Soviet Union, to Middle Eastern states became a contentious issue in the international relations of the 1950s; how contentious was illustrated in the policies of Canada, as she was drawn into the Middle Eastern arms race. In the period immediately following the Second World War, the sale of arms to the Middle East was the exclusive purview of Great Britain and France, which had agreed to respect one another's 'habitual source' status in various parts of the region. Thus, Great Britain would supply states with which she had made bilateral treaties Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and the Gulf states -while France would supply the states formerly under her mandate, Syria and Lebanon.1 By 1950, however, the United States had emerged as a potential competitor for Middle Eastern arms markets. US penetration of this European monopoly was spurred by her arms industry, greatly expanded by the Second World War and now the Korean War, and facilitated by her control over the sale of 'offshore procurement', that is, arms manufactured abroad but financed and licensed by the United States, and earmarked for use by NATO. With the decline of their economies, and the rise of production costs, Great Britain and France had increasingly to resort to offshore procurement to meet their own need for weapons,