Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939-1945: A Study in Statecraft by Bohdan S. s> Kordan (review)

Abstract

158 SEER, 8i, I, 2003 repression.Only those who had been politicallyactivewere sent to the Gulags. There were no immigrantworkersamong those executed by the NKVD, and it seems that most of the arrestedwho were not members of the Communist Partywere allowed, eventually,to leave the country. Ultimately, however, the impact of the volume is diminishedby Mensing's lackof analysis.He makeslittleattemptto engage with the impressiveamount of data he took such trouble to collect. A thorough examination would certainly have been more illuminating for the reader than the extensive catalogue of short biographies given, and it would undoubtedly have contributed to a better understandingof the Stalinistterrormachine. Whilst the publication of the data in itselfis important,offeringa valuable record of the experiences of individuals who became victims of Stalinism, the stories are, in themselves, somewhat repetitive, and readers are likely to become overwhelmed by the mass of biographical details. One is left, therefore,with the feeling that thisis more a commemorativevolume than a scholarlystudy. Hohen Neuendorf WOLFRAM VON SCHELIHA Kordan,BohdanS. Canada andtheUkrainian Question, I939-I945. A Study in Statecraft. McGill-Queen's Studies in Ethnic History, Series 2. McGillQueen 's University Press, Montreal and Kingston, 200I. XiV + 270 pp. Notes. Index. CAN$27.95 (paperback). PROFESSOR BOHDAN S. KORDAN of the Universityof Saskatchewanhaswritten an illuminating and richly detailed study of Canada's 'Ukrainian problem' during WorldWar II. In interwarEurope, the 'UkrainianQuestion' referred to the stateless situation of Ukrainians who, after a brief period of national government in I917-20, found their ethnic lands divided between the Soviet Union and Poland. For Canada, the 'Ukrainian problem' was much more than the country's officialposition on national self-determinationin Eastern Europe. It also involved the question of dealing with Canada's substantial Ukrainian minority, which had campaigned for Ukrainianindependence. As the authordemonstratesconvincingly,concernsaboutforeignpolicy, national security, and popular loyalties became entangled in Canada's official treatment of the UkrainianQuestion. Drawing extensively on Canadian archives with the addition of some British,American, and Russian materials,ProfessorKordan reconstructsthe complex interaction between the Ukrainian Canadian community and the Canadiangovernmentfrom I939-45. In theirmemos and appeals,Ukrainian nationalist activists emphasized the right of national self-determinationas a fundamental value of liberal democracy and one of the sacred principles Canada was fighting for in World War II. While not openly opposing such rhetoric, the government professedpolitical 'realism'privilegingthe national interest over the ideals of universal justice. Until I943, Canada's official position on the Eastern European imbroglio had been to support the restorationof pre-war borders;afterwards,Ottawa moved towards acknowledging Soviet domination in the region. REVIEWS I59 Neither position was satisfactoryfor the Ukrainian community in Canada, leading to deteriorating relations between the nationalist organizations and the state officials.To complicate mattersfurther,the government'sexpertson EasternEurope, such as Tracy Philippsand ProfessorGeorge Simpson, were often more sympatheticthan their superiorsto Ukrainian concerns. Both lost theirjobs in I944 when Canada began building friendly relations with the USSR, and the nationalistappealsfromCanadian Ukrainiansforthe creation of an independent Ukraine became a subjectof Soviet diplomaticprotestsand a source of embarrassmentfor the Canadian government. More important, the bureaucracy dismissed Philipps'sidea of accommodating the minorities' special interests. The view that ethnic organizationswere primarilysecurity concerns triumphed.The police repeatedly,if unsuccessfully,investigatedthe Ukrainian nationalistassociationsfor their suspectedGerman connections or Nazi sympathies.Canadian officialsignored the Ukrainian appeals and tried to prevent anti-Sovietpublic statements. By the war's end, it was clear that the government had failed to 'manage' the Ukrainian problem. Its sponsorship of the creation of an umbrella organization,the UkrainianCanadian Committee, backfiredby providingthe nationalistswith a coordinating body. The work of the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services came to a standstillbecause of the absence of a clear officialpolicy on the minorities.In 1944, the Canadian bureaucracyeven considered grantingdiplomatic recognition to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a way of undermining the nationalists' demand for Ukrainian independence. However, this idea was abandoned afterthe Soviets attemptedto tie Canada'srecognition of Soviet Ukrainewith the Sovietrecognitionof Canada as a separatecountry.Feelinginsecureabout Canada's own internationalstatus,Ottawa shied away from the discussionof Ukraine'sstatehood.Likewise,by I945 Canadianauthoritiesweredetermined to keep their distance from ethnic politics. During the following decade, the Cold War and the mass influx of Ukrainian 'displacedpersons' into...