Abstract
This chapter explores Kripke's sceptical solution. Supposing that the sceptical argument is sound, what prospect is there for a sceptical solution, in other words one that embraces the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter to what we mean? It is argued that the ‘no fact thesis’ is irremediably incoherent, since, if semantic realism is rejected, no statement can be true or justified, even in the weakest sense. Thus, there is no hope for a ‘sceptical solution’ which purports to show that although semantic realism is false, our ascriptions of meaning and content are nevertheless legitimate. Since the appearance of a paradox in the sceptical conclusion cannot be resolved, the chapter provisionally concludes that the argument must falter somewhere.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
