Can third-party market cooperation solve the dilemma of emissions reduction? A case study of energy investment project conflict analysis in the context of carbon neutrality

Abstract

The conflict mechanism of transnational energy investment projects is complex. The current study uses the enhanced graphic model for conflict resolution to build a four-pole game model to discuss the conflict resolution mechanism of energy investment projects. The results depicted that the host country's dilemma of carbon emission reduction and power supply cannot be solved only by unilateral efforts. All parties adopt the game's best strategy (cooperation, cooperation, promotion, support). The project's main investor provides energy that meets the environmental protection requirements. Technology investor provides new technologies for energy conservation and emission reduction. Enterprises of the host country improve various basic measures for carbon emission reduction. Environmental protection organizations and the public support the project and participate in carbon emission supervision. The implementation of energy emission reduction requires the effective participation of social groups, and the participation and supervision of environmental protection organizations and the public are conducive to promoting various stakeholders to achieve a balanced strategy for energy emission reduction. The results provide valuable policy implications for investment decision-makers and an important reference value for third-party market cooperation to solve the dilemma of energy emission reduction.