Can the EU Presidency make its mark on interstate bargains? The Italian and Irish Presidencies of the 2003–04 IGC

Abstract

ABSTRACT According to liberal intergovernmentalism the outcome of EU negotiations is determined by the constellation of member state interests without needing any formal leadership. This article reviews this ‘self-clearing thesis’ in the context of the 2003–04 IGC. It further examines what impact the European Convention, which prepared a comprehensive draft Constitutional Treaty, has had on these negotiations. Three roles of the Italian and the Irish Presidency leading the 2003–04 IGC are analysed: managing the scope of the negotiations' agenda, brokering efficient deals and promoting specific interests. Little evidence is found that the Presidencies really made a substantial difference in brokering the eventual deals or in promoting their own interests. However, the presence of the Convention's draft allowed the Presidencies to adopt an agenda management strategy that changed the nature of the negotiations and the power configuration of interests and thus radically departed from those normally applying at IGCs.