Can the Appellate Body Be Saved?

Abstract

The ‘Walker Paper’ represents a commendable effort to find middle-ground on the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, but does not address the US concerns about the Appellate Body’s overreaching in antidumping, countervailing duty, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XIX ‘escape clause’ disputes, and instead seizes on a series of half-hearted fixes to the long list of concerns in US Trade Representative’s (USTR’s) ‘Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization’. US concerns about overreaching date back to the Bush 43 and Obama Administrations and are rooted in the Appellate Body’s ‘zeroing’ line of cases. The concerns rest on the conviction of US trade officials who participated in the Uruguay Round negotiations and later served in the Bush 43, Obama, and Trump Administrations, that there was never a WTO agreement to abolish ‘zeroing’. This view was shared by the WTO Secretariat and WTO Panels and underpinned the contentious, decade-long impasse between USTR, the WTO Secretariat, and WTO Panels on the one hand, and the Appellate Body and Appellate Body Secretariat on the other. While the Appellate Body’s overreaching has multiple sources, one is its dismissive approach to negotiating history under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, and obsessive reliance on the Oxford English Dictionary as a main source of meaning in interpreting the WTO Agreements. Had the Appellate Body taken a more respectful look at the Uruguay Round negotiating history, it would have found no support for efforts to read a broad prohibition on zeroing into terms that dated back to the Kennedy Round Antidumping Agreement, Tokyo Round Antidumping Code, and GATT 1947. The Appellate Body’s overreaching also appears to stem from hubris, as some Appellate Body Members have sought to make their mark on international jurisprudence or serve as saviours of the WTO system. While some in Geneva are clearly hoping the US concerns will disappear once the Biden Administration takes office, these concerns predated Ambassador Lighthizer by over a decade and are shared by both Republicans and Democratic Members of Congress. Accordingly, even if the new Administration were to seize on some variant of the Walker paper as an excuse to placate US allies and trading partners, it’s unlikely to offer a lasting solution, since the same problems will likely recur without serious systemic and structural reforms. World Trade Organization, WTO, Appellate Body, Dispute Settlement Understanding, Dispute Settlement, Antidumping Agreement, Zeroing