Abstract
We consider a model of law enforcement where homogenous, risk neutral, and corruptible inspectors are responsible for monitoring …rms’ adoption of pollution prevention technology. A welfare maximizing government can implement appropriate wage policies to prevent collusion, but we …nd that governments characterized by high administrative costs in administrating …nes, or by a low ability to spot and prosecute corruption, may prefer to let corruption happen. By allowing …rms to purchase pollution permits in lieu of the technology, the government is able to increase welfare by reducing red tape, keeping a leaner monitoring force, and eliminating rents to its force. The use of permits further bene…ts society by allowing the country to fully eliminate corruption. This theory can be applied in a variety of law enforcement situations.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
