Abstract
Practical reason is defined as the power to cognize and to will the good. Can it be part of an artificial intelligence? According to the author, from a Kantian point of view, the answer is clearly negative: Practical reason cannot be artificial. After presenting a preliminary remark on the possibility of Kantian moral machine, Schönecker argues that in a Kantian model of moral obligation, the typical (human) moral subject must have not only practical reason but also moral feelings in order to cognize the validity of the moral law. Using the knowledge argument against physicalism and functionalism, he continues to argue that computers have no feelings and, a fortiori, no moral feelings; therefore, computers are no moral subjects. This conclusion is based on a Kantian “I feel” rather than the “I think.” Schönecker discusses two problems with this argument and concludes with an analogy: Just as planets do not fly, computers do not feel.
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