Can overarching rules and coordination in polycentric governance help achieve pre‐identified institutional goals over time? Evidence from farmland governance in southeastern France

Abstract

AbstractThe question of the performance of polycentric governance over time is insufficiently addressed in the literature. By performance, we refer to the ability of polycentric governance actors to design rules and engage in coordination processes that allow them to achieve their goals. Through an institutional analysis, this paper seeks to answer a question that remains unresolved in the field, namely the effectiveness of the overarching set of rules and coordination relationships in their ability to drive institutional and organizational change in polycentric governance processes. To this end, we conduct an in‐depth case study of farmland governance in southeastern France. Through the attributes of polycentric governance, we examine the changes brought about by the goal of local food supply comparing it with other historical goals such as farmland preservation. We show that farmland governance is characterized by an institutional mismatch that prevents its actors from moving closer to the objective of local food supply. We argue that the evolution of farmland governance comes down to organizational change that does not lead to an evolution of rules‐in‐use. We discuss this result in light of the findings of the literature on polycentric governance and its implications for public policy.