Abstract

We extend the resource dependence theory to argue for the opposing effects of political relationship building on new ventures’ abilities to obtain suppliers and buyers. By signaling endorsement and better access to resources, political connection enhances new ventures’ legitimacy and bargaining position. In supply chains featuring high contractual uncertainties, suppliers favor new ventures with higher certainty of payment but buyers can be deterred by new ventures more difficult to control. Hence, paradoxically, political relationship building can exert opposing effects on a new venture’s acquisition of suppliers and buyers. We found empirical support through a survey of 337 new ventures in China.

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