Abstract
AbstractI address Andrew Moon's recent discussion (2016, this journal) of the question whether third‐factor accounts are valid responses to debunking arguments against moral realism. Moon argues that third‐factor responses are valid under certain conditions but leaves open whether moral realists can use his interpretation of the third‐factor response to defuse the evolutionary debunking challenge. I rebut Moon's claim and answer his question. Moon's third‐factor reply is valid only if we accept externalism about epistemic defeaters. However, even if we do, I argue, the conditions Moon identifies for a valid third‐factor response are not met in the case of moral realism.
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