Can media coverage improve the information disclosure quality of government final accounts?

Abstract

Public disclosure of the government’s budget is a prerequisite for the improvement of fiscal transparency and governance in government. This paper examines media attention following the disclosure of budget information by central government departments, and empirically analyses the impact of media coverage on the information disclosure quality of government final accounts. It is found that: (1) media coverage effectively improves the information disclosure quality of government final accounts through an information intermediary function (in relation to neutral reports) and a reputation management function (in relation to positive and negative reports); (2) the information intermediary function of media is vulnerable to the replacement of department officials, i.e. replacement of an official will weaken the positive relationship between neutral reports and the information disclosure quality of departmental final accounts; (3) the reputation management function of media is vulnerable to the performance of departmental final accounts, i.e. poor performance in final accounts will weaken the positive relationship between emotional reports (negative reports or positive reports) and the information disclosure of departmental final accounts. This paper contributes to the literature of media governance in the public domain from the perspective of information disclosure quality, and also reveals the potential constraints on the information intermediary function and the reputation management function of media.