Can Investment Views Explain Why People Insure Their Cell Phones But Not Their Homes?—A New Perspective on the Catastrophe Insurance Puzzle

Abstract

The consistently missing demand for catastrophe insurance and for coverage of other low-probability–high-consequence risks is often referred to as the catastrophe insurance puzzle. People show reluctance to insure low-probability–high-consequence events, even with some disastrous consequences, yet insure against small high-probability–low-consequence events. There has been no convincing explanation of this puzzle to this date. This article points out that the underlying rationale may be that individuals interpret insurance contracts with low payout probability as an investment with negative expected net present value. While premium payments start with the conclusion of the contract, usually there is only one loss payment in the near or far future. Using a simple annuity model with fixed annual premiums and expected indemnity payouts, it is found that even an individual characterized by the degree of risk aversion found in the literature is unlikely to purchase insurance with these characteristics. To alleviate this unfavorable insurance purchase syndrome, combining a low-probability with a high-probability loss insurance contract may be a way to incentivize individuals to purchase catastrophe risk coverage.