Can Grounded Theory solve the Problems of its Critics?

Abstract

With reference to a typology distinguishing six notions of theory, grounded theory is a case of the explanation-based type of theory reflecting a pragmatist attitude. This essay evaluates the criticism waged against grounded theory. John Goldthorpe’s criticism, a side effect of his attempt to synthesize two standard notions of theory, leads him to establish an unbridgeable theory/context divide which, in the end, he cannot sustain. Grounded theory is not committed to such a divide and can thus solve one of Goldthorpe’s main problems, which is that he cannot establish any theory (and thus not explain) without some «delimitation of scope» or context. Michael Burawoy’s criticism reflects his commitment to a critical notion of theory, but he fails to argue convincingly how his own «extended case method» can be distinguished from grounded theory. His ability to reflect on ethnographic research is hampered by a social-philosophical attitude (more specifically, a Marxist variety of that attitude). Grounded theory can help Burawoy out of at least one of his main problems, which is that successful pursuit of the extended case method requires that the determining macrocontext is analysed in a grounded way. In terms of concepts that we define in this essay, both the standard and the social-philosophical attitude pursue high-level notions of theory. Our discussion supports the broader conclusion that such notions tend to hamper the accumulation of empirical knowledge in the social sciences. If the pragmatist attitude is one that also standard and social-philosophical social scientists will always be forced to accommodate in some sense, why not consider it – and the low/middle-level notions of theory it implies – in its own right?