Can governments prevent ethnic violence through public goods spending? A cross‐country investigation

Abstract

AbstractThis study investigates how governments' spending on public goods affects the onset of ethnic violence. Do governments make particularistic or public goods spending? And, how do governments' spending behaviour affect the escalation of ethnic violence? This study links the literatures on ethnic competition, rent‐seeking and government impartiality and examines the effect of level of impartiality in the provision of public goods on ethnic violence. It is expected that particularistic policymaking and spending can increase the risk of ethnic violence because it can contribute to horizontal group grievances and rent‐seeking over state resources. Analyses of 152 countries from 1946 to 2010 show that a one‐standard deviation increase in impartial governance of public goods lowers the risk of ethnic violence a substantial 25% to 28% even with consideration of a battery of control variables. To facilitate peace in ethnically divided countries, international policymakers and states should promote impartial policies targeted at the provision of public goods for all communities and groups.