Can Folk Aesthetics Ground Aesthetic Realism?

Abstract

ABSTRACTWe challenge an argument that aims to support Aesthetic Realism by claiming, first, that sense is realist about aesthetic judgments because it considers that aesthetic judgments can be right or wrong, and, second, that because Aesthetic Realism comes from and accounts for aesthetics, it is the best aesthetic theory available. We empirically evaluate this argument by probing whether ordinary people with no training whatsoever in the subtle debates of aesthetic philosophy consider their aesthetic judgments as right or wrong. Having shown that the results do not support the main premise of the argument, we discuss the consequences for Aesthetic Realism and address possible objections to our study.1. Introduction1.1 The common sense argument a ground for Aesthetic Realism?Several arguments are used to support Aesthetic Realism. Among these, one consists in appealing to aesthetics, that is, to common-sense beliefs about aesthetic judgments, and more precisely to the fact that lay-persons are natural normativists.1Traditionally (at least since Kant), philosophers consider that aesthetic judgments possess at least the following features: aestheticism (i.e., aesthetic judgments ascribe aesthetic values to things, persons, and events) and (i.e., aesthetic judgments for universal validity in the sense that when one formulates an aesthetic judgment, she considers her judgment as being either correct or incorrect so that, in a contradictory aesthetic debate, each side believes that at most one of them is right). Philosophical theories according to which aesthetic judgments actually possess such correctness (or incorrectness) are normativist theories. Others, which hold that aesthetic judgments do not possess this feature, we call skeptic theories.2 The claim according to which aesthetic judgments possess normativity is thus equivalent to the claim that laypeople are normativist.As such, Aesthetic Realism is a normativist theory. Reference to and folk normativism in aesthetic judgments appears in an argument with two steps for Aesthetic Realism, which is summed up by Zangwill (2001).Both realism and non-realism are on a par as far as the experiential aspect of aesthetics is concerned. But when it comes to explaining the of aesthetic judgements, the realist is ahead [...] I conclude that folk aesthetics is thus realist. Whether or not the tacit folk metaphysical commitment to aesthetic facts or states of affair is justified is another matter, but our aesthetic judgments presuppose that metaphysics. What is not an option is holding some non-realist view, be it Humean, Kantian or dispositional, while we can unproblematically retain our ordinary practice of making aesthetic judgments.The first step states that laypeople are normativist when it comes to aesthetic judgments (or, to put it in different words, that is indeed a property of lay aesthetic judgments). Accordance with folk aesthetics is capital for Aesthetic Realism. Indeed, it is important for Aesthetic Realism not to conflict with ordinary judgments for two reasons. First, by doing so, it compels the concurrent theories (those which agree with Aesthetic Skepticism) to endorse the argumentative burden of proving that and explaining why laypeople are wrong. Second, it allows Realism to compensate for its metaphysical disadvantage. Indeed, Aesthetic Realism is more metaphysically demanding than Aesthetic Skepticism because the former appeals to aesthetic entities,3 whereas the latter does not. Thus, if it were shown that Aesthetic Realism conflicts with sense, then motivations for holding such a theory would be very thin because, in this case, Aesthetic Realism would be at the same time more metaphysically demanding and in need of an error theory.The purpose of the second step is to show that Aesthetic realism is the best theory available. …