Abstract

Every 10 years, U.S. states must redraw their Congressional districts. It is widely believed that political parties redraw districts to favor their own candidates (gerrymandering). We test this claim by exploiting the discontinuous change in a political party's control of redistricting triggered when its share of seats in the state legislature exceeds 50 percent. We find evidence of gerrymandering, but it has the opposite effect from that intended. Gerrymandering creates districts with narrow majorities of supporters. These majorities are ultimately eroded by demographic shifts and the response of opposing interest groups. Republicans actually win fewer elections when they control redistricting.

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