Abstract

To contribute to global sustainability, many manufacturers are starting to implement green product development and trying to provide environmentally friendly products. Although green products are environmentally beneficial to our society, the performance of green product development remains poor because of cannibalization from traditional alternatives at lower prices. This is particularly the case in the current unforgiving marketing reality in which many brand retailers, such as Wal-Mart, Tesco, and Carrefour, offer their own store brands as traditional alternatives. Although a large stream of research has studied the effects of competition on manufacturers’ green design, to the best of our knowledge, there is a dearth of research on the effects of competition from retailers’ store brands on manufacturers’ green design. To fill this gap, we present two models in which the manufacturer has an incentive to design for the environment, and the retailer has the flexibility to sell store brands (Model S), or it does not (Model N). Surprisingly, our analysis indicates that the presence of store brands may stimulate the manufacturer to release a new greener version of the national brand. Moreover, we find that although the presence of store brands is beneficial to the retailer and industry, it always hurts the manufacturer’s profitability. To incentivize the manufacturer to support Model S, we propose a two-part tariff contract.

Highlights

  • To achieve sustainable development in both economic and environmental contexts, many governments and environmental groups are sparing no effort to encourage consumers to buy “green” products that are “low-carbon”, “renewable”, “energy-efficient”, and “ecologically friendly”

  • Motivated by this fundamental research question, we present two models in which the manufacturer has an incentive to design for the environment, and the retailer has the flexibility to sell store brands (Model S), or it does not (Model N)

  • As regards the manufacturer’s incentives for green design, our analysis reveals that, contrary to popular belief, the presence of store brands may stimulate the manufacturer to release a new greener version of the national brand

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Summary

Introduction

To achieve sustainable development in both economic and environmental contexts, many governments and environmental groups are sparing no effort to encourage consumers to buy “green” products that are “low-carbon”, “renewable”, “energy-efficient”, and “ecologically friendly”. If manufacturers intend to design for the environment with a price premium, the days of ignoring cannibalization problems from retailers’ store brands are over because “boosting prices further could drive consumers to buy even more private-label goods (retailer store bands), reducing the companies’ sales volume and squeezing their profit margins at the factory level by raising the cost of production per unit” [24]. There is an urgent need for more research on sustainable practices through the lenses of different sectoral innovation systems, new business model perspectives, technological, organizational, and social practices [6] To fill this gap, we present two theoretical models to analyze the problem of confronting competition from retailers’ store brands: Can a manufacturer benefit from design for the environment?.

Literature Review
Model B
Model S
Model Analysis
Comparing Optimal Strategies
Comparing Incentives for Green Design
Managerial and Theoretical Implications
Findings
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Full Text
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