Can closure of live poultry markets halt the spread of H7N9?

Guillaume Fournié,Dirk U Pfeiffer

doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(13)62109-1

Abstract

Highlights

After isolation of avian influenza A H7N9 virus from live poultry markets (LPMs), and reports that several people who were infected with the virus had visited such markets a few days before disease onset, LPMs were suspected to be a main source of human exposure to H7N9 in China.[1]
The investigators used information about laboratory-confirmed cases of avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection reported in the four cities by June 7, 2013, to fit a statistical model to assess the daily probability of infection for each susceptible individual before and after LPM closure
They conclude that LPM closure should be sustained in areas with high risk of disease spread, and implemented in any urban areas where avian influenza A H7N9 virus appears in the future

Summary

Introduction

After isolation of avian influenza A H7N9 virus from live poultry markets (LPMs), and reports that several people who were infected with the virus had visited such markets a few days before disease onset, LPMs were suspected to be a main source of human exposure to H7N9 in China.[1]. After isolation of avian influenza A H7N9 virus from live poultry markets (LPMs), and reports that several people who were infected with the virus had visited such markets a few days before disease onset, LPMs were suspected to be a main source of human exposure to H7N9 in China.[1] After LPM closure was enforced in several Chinese cities, the incidence of H7N9 human cases rapidly reduced.[2] In The Lancet, Hongjie Yu and colleagues[3] quantify the risk of human infections before and after LPM closure in the Chinese cities of Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Huzhou.

Results

Conclusion