Can blockchain help curb “greenwashing” in green finance? - Based on tripartite evolutionary game theory

Abstract

To encourage enterprises to take green innovation, the Chinese government has been promoting the development of green finance. However, it has brought about the risk of “greenwashing”. This article analyzes “greenwashing” from the perspective of government intervention, focusing on the stakeholder theory and institutional theory that influence the decision-making of participants in green finance, constructing a three-party evolutionary game model for enterprises, green financial institutions, and local governments. By comparing the stable strategy changes before and after the introduction of blockchain technology, the mechanism of blockchain in addressing the “greenwashing” risk in green finance is discussed. The study shows that: first, government regulation plays a crucial role in stimulating enterprises to engage in green innovation and encouraging green financial institutions to provide financial services; Second, before the application of blockchain technology, low-intensity regulation cannot curb the “greenwashing” of enterprises and fails to stimulate them to engage in green innovation. However, after applying blockchain technology, even under low-intensity regulation, enterprises will actively engage in green innovation under the reputation mechanism constructed in the architecture of a consortium chain. This work provides a theoretical framework and guidance for subsequent scholars to conduct quantitative research on the resolution of “greenwashing” in green finance from a government perspective using blockchain.