Can arms breed peace? The consequence of arms imports from the US on civil wars

Abstract

While little evidence sheds light on the positive role of arms, it is still arguably possible for arms imports to reduce conflicts. In this study, we examine whether and how arms imports from the US affect internal conflicts in 135 non-OECD countries. Leveraging a two-way interacted instrumental variable, we exploit a time-series variation of arms supply that arises from the political component of the US Congress and a cross-country variation of arms demand measured as the propensity of purchasing arms. Our analysis reveals that importing US arms exerts a significantly negative impact on the incidence of civil war, particularly in recipients with extreme climate conditions, scarce natural resources, or less diversified socio-demographic structures. We further provide explanations for such a positive role of arms imports by examining the existence of a deterrent effect, the enhancement of public confidence, and the strengthening of state capacity.