Abstract
Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize her understanding of a wise society. Finally, I discuss how what has been said can inform how one should think about democratic theory.
Highlights
It seems trivial, or at least, true that it is good for a society to be free.1 it seems that a wise society is better than an unwise one, all else held equal
Margaret Gilbert has suggested that an argument can be made that these two desiderata of social organization seem to be incompatible
Gilbert gives a negative argument to show that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom (Gilbert, 2006, p. 152)
Summary
At least, true that it is good for a society to be free. it seems that a wise society is better than an unwise one, all else held equal. At least, true that it is good for a society to be free.. At least, true that it is good for a society to be free.1 It seems that a wise society is better than an unwise one, all else held equal. I show that Gilbert’s negative argument fails to be convincing. I, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize her understanding of a wise society. McMahon, in his criticism of Gilbert, suggests a more procedural understanding of a wise society and how a collective agent—like a society—comes to know.
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