Abstract
To further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Draft)” to propose the implementation of power sales side Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which cannot be realized without an effective government regulation mechanism. However, information asymmetry and the limited rationality of the regulatory agencies and private power sales companies in the regulation process make the regulatory effect uncertain to the detriment of a sustainable regulation of the power industry. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the regulation mechanism of the RPS policy in China. We considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies, and established an evolutionary game model based on a limited rationality. We also analyzed the implementation effects of the static reward penalty mechanism and dynamic reward penalty mechanism, respectively. The system dynamics (SD) simulation results showed that under the static reward penalty mechanism, there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, and there will be volatility that exists in the evolution process. However, the dynamic reward penalty mechanism can effectively solve these problems. What is more, our results implied that governments should formulate appropriate RPS quotas, improve the green certificate trading mechanism, and take into account the market size of power sales while implementing RPS policy.
Highlights
Promoting the sustainable development of renewable energy is a measure in response to issues like the shortage of fossil fuels, environmental pollution, climate change, and energy security, as well as an important means to achieve a healthy and sustainable development of society and economy [1].In recent years, low-carbon transformation and the upgrading of the power industry have been valued by countries around the world
To systematically analyze the power sales side renewable portfolio standard (RPS) government regulation problem, based on the evolutionary game theory, we considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies based on a limited rationality [39,40]
We considered the competitive relationship between equilibrium state in the sales-side quota system regulation game will be greatly reduced; that is, the equilibrium state in the sales-side quota system regulation game will be greatly reduced; that is, the size of the electricity sales market becomes larger
Summary
Promoting the sustainable development of renewable energy is a measure in response to issues like the shortage of fossil fuels, environmental pollution, climate change, and energy security, as well as an important means to achieve a healthy and sustainable development of society and economy [1]. New power sales channels need to be developed, value-added services be provided, and cross-regional transaction contracts be signed with renewable energy generation companies. Based on the above analysis, we can find that during the implementation of the power sales side RPS policy, the decision-making targets between power sales companies and government regulation agencies are not consistent, and their strategic selections affect each other. This is in line with the theoretical characteristics of game theory, a theory mainly used to study how multiple agencies maximize their own interests [35]. The strategy selection of game agents and the strategy selection evolution processes under the static reward–penalty mechanism and the dynamic reward–penalty mechanism were analyzed
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