Can a constitutional monarch influence democratic preferences? Japanese emperor and the regulation of public expression

Abstract

AbstractObjectiveThis study examines whether hereditary constitutional monarchs have any influence on democratic public opinion, focusing on the case of the Japanese emperor.MethodsA survey experiment on the regulation of public expression. This issue can be framed both as left wing (i.e., the regulation of hate speech) and right wing (i.e., the regulation of publicly funded anti‐nationalistic exhibitions). Taking advantage of the dual nature of the issue, we test the effects of the emperor's endorsement on support for regulation under each ideological frame.ResultsThe (former) emperor's endorsement for freedom of expression does have a cross‐cutting effect and decreases support for regulation. This effect is relatively small but statistically significant. Additionally, the findings provide weak evidence for the emperor's own ideological position conditioning his endorsement effect.ConclusionHereditary monarchs do influence democratic public opinion, and their influence can cross‐cut ideology.