Abstract

Trace-based simulation is a widely used methodology for system design exploration. It relies on realistic traces that represent a range of behaviors necessary to be evaluated, containing a lot of information about the application, its inputs and the underlying system on which it was generated. Consequently, generating traces from real-world executions risk leakage of sensitive information. To prevent this, traces can be obfuscated before release. However, this can undermine their ideal utility, i.e., how realistically a program behavior was captured. To address this, we propose Camouflage, a novel obfuscation framework, designed with awareness of the necessary architectural properties required to preserve trace utility , while ensuring secrecy of the inputs used to generate the trace. Focusing on memory access traces, our extensive evaluation on various benchmarks shows that camouflaged traces preserve the performance measurements of the original execution, with an average τ correlation of 0.66. We model input secrecy as an input indistinguishability problem and show that the average security loss is 7.8%, which is better than traces generated from the state-of-the-art.

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