Cameron v The Queen: A Consideration of Sentencing Principles Applicable to Pleas of Guilty

Joel Shaw

doi:10.5204/qutlr.v2i2.104

Abstract

This article examines the sentencing principles enunciated in Cameron v The Queen. With respect to the principles applicable to pleas of guilty, it considers: the subjective and objective rationales for mitigation of sentence; the discrimination generated by reliance on purely objective justifications for mitigation of sentence; and the proper approach to be adopted by sentencing judges in making mitigation and arriving at sentence. This article also examines the reception of Cameron to date and argues that despite their consideration by five members of the High Court, these sentencing principles may have limited application in future.

Highlights

In Cameron v The Queen,[1] all five members of the High Court embraced an opportunity to address a number of sentencing principles relevant to pleas of guilty
The case itself was concerned with an issue relatively narrow in scope, it seemed important for each judge to promulgate their own agenda for the development of sentencing law in Australia
This article will examine each judgment and the sentencing principles to which they relate. It will briefly consider the indifferent reception of Cameron in the various state jurisdictions and speculate on the prospect of its continued application

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In Cameron v The Queen,[1] all five members of the High Court embraced an opportunity to address a number of sentencing principles relevant to pleas of guilty. The case itself was concerned with an issue relatively narrow in scope, it seemed important for each judge to promulgate their own agenda for the development of sentencing law in Australia. This article will examine each judgment and the sentencing principles to which they relate. It will briefly consider the indifferent reception of Cameron in the various state jurisdictions and speculate on the prospect of its continued application

A Discrimination and the Rationale for Mitigation

B Discrimination in the Federal Jurisdiction

C Two Tier v Instinctive Synthesis

CONCLUSION