Cambodia in 1996: Of Tigers, Crocodiles, and Doves

Abstract

Three interrelated dynamics have shaped Cambodia's politics in the past year: growing tensions between the two components of the governmental coalition, a major scission in the Khmer Rouge (KR), and an increasing marginalization of democratic forces in the country. A rift between First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh, of the royalist Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC), and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), developed as the need for both leaders to strengthen their respective power base came to outweigh, in their view, the risks of political destabilization in Cambodia. A split within the ranks of the KR added to the virulence of those tensions. Ieng Sary, one of the emblematic figures of the guerrilla group, led a rebellion in August against the rest of the KR leadership, effectively setting up autonomous control over a sizable portion of KR fighting forces in an area rich in the gems and timber that have been the guerrillas' most essential source of revenue. The rivalry between the two premiers was thus heightened as each courted the renegade KR leader to improve his political and military standing vis-a-vis the other. Toward the end of the year, Cambodia seemed a fractured society as it has been so often in the past, riven by deep-seated factional strife and distrust and prone to violence. As a consequence, the fragile institutional framework put in place by the Prince Ranariddh-Hun Sen government in the wake of the May 1993 elections looked ever weaker, as did the chances of democratic forces in Cambodia having a significant influence over the short-term political evolution of the country. Developments in the economic and foreign affairs fields played against these dynamics. Economic growth remained a function of political stability.